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Shooting Blanl<s: The Inffictiveness of the Executive Branch's Entrance into the Great Patent
Troll Hunt
Daniet A. Tagliente-
I. Introduction
Many regard the American patent system as a great institution that provides incredible
value to the United States economy.l This notion is not universal, however, and some believe
that the patent system does not provide value or should be abolished altogether.2 Despite those
who discount its value, there are many benefits that the American patent system brings. patent-
intensive industries provide over seven millionjobs3 and, along with other intellectual property
fields, account for up to 34.8 percent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP).a Many
patent-intensive industries are made up oflarge corporations with extensive patent portfolios,
which are used to generate profit from licensing fees as well as to protect against infringers.5
Although the patent system is fundamentally important to many ofthese large corporations that
may have hundreds or thousands of patents issued each year,6 the patent system can bejust as
valuable to individual inventors and small businesses trying to protect the rights associated with
their imovation and ingenuity.
For some small businesses and individual inventors, the patent system sometimes
embodies the "American Dream" because of the way in which it rewards the individual who
' J.D. Candidate,20l5, Seton Hall University School ofLaw; M.S., Lehigh Uniyersio/, 20 l0; 8.S., Lehigh
UniYersity, 2009.
I See Lamar Smith, Protecling Americos ldeas, (Apr.2O,2001) httpl llamarsmith.house.gov/media-
center/columns/protecting-americas-ideas ("Strengthening intellectual property leads to economic growth, job
creation and the type ofcreativity that has made America the envy ofthe world."). see a/so Economics and
Statistics Administration & United States Patent and Trademark Office, Intellectual Property and the u.S. Economy:
Industries in Focus, (Mar- 2012), available qt hltpllwww.lspto.goy/news/publications/lP_Report March 20l2.pdf(explaining the estimated financial impacts ofintellectual property on the US economy).
2 See, e.g., Mark D. Janis, Patent Abolitionism, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 899 (2002).
3 Intellectual Property and the U.S. Economy: Industries in Focus, szpra note 1..
4 ld. at Yii.
ssee Patrick rhomas & Anthony Breitzman, Patent Power2012, IEEESPECTRUM(Dec.3,2012,17:ll GMT). The
referenc€d patent power scorecard is available at http://spectrum. ieee.org/ns/pdfs/20l2Patentscorecard2a.pdf.6ld.
comes up with an innovative idea and succeeds in reducing it to practice through his own
intellectual efforts, hard work, and determination.T The patent system operates in a quid pro quo
nature, granting an inventor the right to exclude "others from making, using, offering for sale, or
selling the invention"8 in exchange for a fully enabling disclosure of how the invention can be
made or used.e
Over the course of the last several years, much of the intellectual property community has
realized that the patent system is not perfect. Some have suggested that the patent system must
evolve in order to keep up with the ever-changing nature of technology and of the global
market.lo There have been several recent attempts to institute this evolution of the patent system.
For instance, since 2000, the regulatory side ofthe patent system has been strengthened and has
caused the patent system to move away from several of the traditional principles upon which it
has previously relied, and instead, be subject to stricter governmental controls.ll Although these
controls may intend to create a more efficient environment, they may actually restrict the free
market and hinder innovation.l2
Of the numerous developing issues within the intellectual property community, one of the
more recent and pervasive concerns has been both the impact of, and the question of how to
7 See Campbell Chiang, Article, A Putative Inventor's Remedies to Correct Inventorship on A Patent,2 Dure L' &
TEcu. Rrv. 20 (2003).
8 35 U.S.C. $ lsa(a)(l) (2014).
e See Jornq SCHLTCHER, PATENT Lew: LEcal AND ECoNoMIC PRINCIPLEs $ l3:5 (2d ed. 2003) (discussing the quid
pro quo nature of the patent system).
io See Manny Schecter, The Emerging Global Market for Intellectual Property, FORBES (Apr. 18, 2012, 12:47 AM)
hffp://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentraV2O12l04llSlthe-emerging-global-market-for-intellectual-property' ("IP
systems must continue to evolve to help foster a robust market."); see a/so Colleen V. Chien, Turn the Tables on
Patent Trol/s, FoneEs (Aug. 9,2Oll,l l:37 PM) http://www.forbes.com/siteslciocentrall2Ol l/08/09/turn-the-tables-
on-patent-trolls. ("Of course, Iiom a societal perspective, patent law needs to evolve to meet the changing needs of
modern society. That means finding a balance between adequately protecting innovation while reducing the payday
for those pursuing litigation over patents held on small advances in complex technologies.").
rr See Mark A. Lemley, The Regulatory Turn in lP,36 HARV. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 109, I l0 (2013) (discussing the
change of the patent system from an institution guided by common law principles to one guided by regulatory
principles).
t2 Id.
address, the "non-practicing entity" (NPE) or "patent assertion entity" (PAE) within the context
ofthe overall patent system.ls Although these groups have been recognized since at least the
early l990s,la they have received much greater in recent years. The actual terms "non-practicing
entity" and "patent assertion entity" are neutral descriptions,ls but NPEs and PAEs are also
commonly referred to by the pejorative term "patent trolls."r6 Rather than residing in solitude
throughout remote mountain communities,lT these types oftrolls often seek refuge under the
shelter of a "shell" company and are armed with an arsenal ofissued but non-practiced patents.
Patent trolls-and the closely related group of "patent privatge15"l8-41s often criticized for
misusing and manipulating the patent system in a way that limits, impedes, and generally hurts
both trade and innovation by leveraging patents without advancing science or technology.le
These criticisms are based on the fact that "patent trolls" often do not produce or sell actual
products or inventions and are therefore "non-practicing." Instead of simply protecting their
legal rights, these entities are often viewed as extortionists who choose to assert a patent solely in
order to sue others, rather than practicing the invention on the open market.2o The matter is
r3 See Leonid Kravets, These Aren't the Pqtent Trolls You're Looking For, TECH CRUNCH (Apr. I l, 2014)
http://techcrunch.coll20l4l04/1 I /these-arent-the-patent-trolls-youre-looking-for/.
ra See Brenda Sandblurg, Battling the Pqtent Trolls, THERECoRDER (Jul. 30, 2001) (discussing how the first known
public use ofthe term "patent troll" was in 1993 by Peter Detkin, former general counsel at Intel, who created the
term as a result ofbeing sued for libel after describing a group as "patent extortionists").
r5 See Amicus Brief of Time Wamer Inc., Amazon.Com, lnc., Chevron Corp., Cisco Systems, Inc., Google Inc.,
IAC/lnteractive Corp., Infineon Technologies AG, Shell Oil Co. & Visa U.S.A., lnc., eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837 (2006) (No.05-130) at 5.
16 Lamina Packing Innoyations, LLC v. Monsieur Touton Selection, Ltd., l2 CIV. 5039 CM, 2013 WL l42l'l9l
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2013).
r7 The origin oftrolls can be traced back to Scandinavian folklore, in \iihich they are depicted as unfiiendly, hermir
like powerful, and dumb beings that often run into conflict with humans, although they prefer to live an isolationist
lifestyle, seeking refuge in mountains and caves.
r8 
"Patent Privateers" are considered by many to be a variant ofaO?ical patent assertion entity, These entities are
authorized by a patent owner or are sold patent rights with lhe intention ofattacking another company, usually a
competitor of the original patent holder. See Thomas L. Ewing, tndirect Exploitqtion of lntellectual Property Rights
by Corporations and lnvestors: IP Privateering & Modern Letters of Mar<1ue & Reprisal,4 HASTTNGS SCl. & TECH.
L.J. l, s (20r2).
re Jeremiah chan & Matthew Fawcetl. Footsteps of the parenl Troll, l0 INTLLL. pRop. L. Bur.L. l, 25 (2005)
20 see eBay v. MercExchange, L.L.c.. 54'1 u.s. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concuning) (statini thai some .,firms
use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees,,).
complicated, however, by the fact that apatent holder who does not practice his invention is still
fully within his rights to file a lawsuit if his patent has been infringed.2r
Often, the primary goal of NPEs and PAEs is to produce a revenue stream by forcing
companies that sell products which may be similar to the claimed invention to surrender
licensing fees.22 With the costs of defending allegations of improper patent use reaching up to
$5 million,23 most defendants, particularly small and mid-sized businesses or individuals, would
rather reach a settlement or licensing agreement than litigate.2a Many consider this strategy of
suing an alleged infringer-particularly a small entity that lacks the financial resources necessary
to put on a defense-and forcing them into reaching a settlement agreement as "abusive."25
Even when a defendant does not quickly seek a settlement and a patent troll's lawsuit goes to
court, the patent troll receives a significant procedural advantage because the United States Code
tends to favor the patentee, as demonstrated by the fact that patent holders receive a presumption
of validity for their patents-an assumption that then must be refuted by the defendant.26 This
business model results in a flourishing patent troll industry.27
Identifying a "patent troll" is not always an easy task. There is no official legal definition
for the term, and parties disagree as to the term's true definition.28 Courts have tried to define
the term, and although definitions may vary, many accept that the term "patent troll" usually
2t See35 U.S.C. $ 271(d) (2012).
22 Id.
23 Jim Kerstetter, How Much Is That Patent Lqwsuit Going to Cost You?, CNETNEWS (Apr. 5, 2012, l0:00 PM)
http://news.cnet.com/8301-32973_-57409792-296lhow-much-is-that-patent-lawsuit-going-to-cost-yor.r/.
24 Id.
2s See, e.g.,John Malcolm and Andrew Kloster, A Balanced Approach to Patent Reform: Addressing the Patent-
Troll Problem Without Stifling Innovation, THE HERITAGT FOtxoauON (Jan. 9,2014)
http://www.heritage.org/rlsearch/report sl2014l0l/a-balanced-approach-to-patent-reform-addressing-the-patent-troll-
problem-without-stifling-innovation (comparing actions filed by patent trolls to other "nuisance" lawsuits in which
the primary goal of initiating litigation is to extract a settlement).
26 See 35 U.S.C. $ 282 (2013).
27 See Charles E. Schumer, A Strategtfor Combating Patent Trolls,Wall St. J. (June 12,2013,6:59 PM)
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 1 0001424127887323844804578531021238656366.
28 See Mark A. Lemley, Missing the Forest for Trolls, I l3 COLUM. L. REV. 2ll7 n.41 (2013).
refers to an entity "who enforces patent rights against accused infringers in an attempt to collect
licensing fees, but does not manufacture products or supply services based on the patents in
question."2e The term has developed an additionat pejorative connotation through its use within
the intellectual property community, although it has sometimes also been adopted----or even
embraced-by those whom the term is meant to describe.3o
The intellectual property community is engaged in an ongoing debate as to whether
"patent trolls" pose a legitimate threat to the patent system and to the economy.3l While there
are some who believe that patent trolls are nonthreatening or actually benefit the economy,32
other analysts estimate that patent troll activity may cost the American economy approximately
$29 billion33 - or in some other estimates, up to $80 billiofa-in lost growth each year. Based
on this information and the way in which patent trolls often intend to extract settlements and
licensing fees from sometimes innocent parties,s5 this Comment operates under the presumption
that patent trolls do pose a legitimate threat to innovation and to the economy, and that their
abusive litigation tactics should be eliminated in order to protect and benefit the United States
patent system.
Courts have also acknowledged the difficulty involved in defining what exactly makes an
entity a "patent troll"-a complex determination that is compounded by the fact that there is
2e Internet Ad Systems, LLC v. Opodo, Ltd.,48l F.Supp.2d 596,601 (N.D.Tex.2007).
r0 J.P. Mello, Legal Update, Technologt Licensing qnd patent ?'rol/s, 12 B.U. J. Scl. & TECH. L. 3gg, 388-89 (2006).3t cotnpare J.P. Mello, Technologt Licensing qnd pqtent Trolls, 12 B.u. J. scr. & TECH. L. 3gg (2006) lrr7l, James
F. McDonough [ll, Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of rhe Function ofpatent Dealers
in an ldea Economy, 56 EMoRy L.J. 189 (2006) (arguing that parent trolls benefit iociety by acting as an
intermediary in the patent market resulting in liquidity and increased efficiency in the patent mark-et).
32 See James F. McDonough lll, supra noie 3l (arguing that patent trolls beneit society by acting as an intermediary
in the patent market resulting in Iiquidity and increased efficiency).
13 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costsfrom Nii D*putes 1Bos. Univ. School ofLaw, Working
Paper No. 12-34,2012), qvailable qthftpl/ papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.clln?abstract id:20g1210.I Katherine Lugar, AH&LA president and CEO, Patent Troll Lawsuits Cost u.s. economy Sao siilion annuatty,
October 29, 201 3, www.hotelnewsresource.com/article74655.html
35 See Malcolm and Kloster, slrpra note 25.
significant disagreement as to whether or not they pose arealproblem.36 Despite this
uncertainty, however, these same courts have acknowledged that they are not properly situated to
make this determination, and that the matter should be left to Congress, which is better
positioned to address issues related to patent troll and the patent system as a whole.37 One
exception to this statement is the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC),38 which has
jurisdiction provided by statute that allows it to hear appeals arising from decisions made by the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO).3e The CAFC has taken several steps to
reduce abusive patent litigation,ao but it has not offered a complete solution. Despite its
authority, the CAFC itself has stated that it must defer to Congress on issues of 'Judgment in
effectuating and maintaining a patent system."4l The regulation and policing of patent trolls
likely falls within the scope of this statement. The Supreme Court of the United States has also
echoed this sentiment.az The judiciary's suggestion to leave the power of policing and governing
the patent system to Congress is not novel, however, as this power is explicitly given to Congress
in the United States Constitution.a3
Despite Congress's enumerated power over the patent systemaa and the deference given
to Congress by the courts, police action against "patent trolls" now has a new enforcer-the
Executive Branch. President Barack Obama entered the great patent troll hunt in July 2013 when
36 Overstock.com, Inc. v. Fumace Brook, LLC,42O F. Supp. 2d 1217,1223 (D. Utah 2005). ("Unlike Congress, this
court is not in a position to know how many patent trolls exist and how often they send letters to potential infringers
(except those in their own state) in the hope that the letters' recipients will opt to license their patent instead of
paying potentially staggering litigation defense costs. . . . These matters, however, must be left to either Congress to
resolve as a matter of statutory change or to the Federal Circuit as a matter of case law change.")
31 Id.
38 Id.
3e 28 U.S.C. $ 1295(a) (2012).
ao See, e.g.,KilopurrTechnology,Inc. v. SidenseCorporation,C10-0206651,2012 WL 1534065 (N.D. Cal. May 1,
2012) G;lding tLat a request for fee shifting does not require a "smoking gun," but instead, only requires a
misguided belief based on zealousness).
arBrooks v. Dunlop Mfg. Inc., 702F-3d624,632-33 (Fed. Cir.2012)'
a2 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,20445 (2003).
43 U.S. CoNST. art. I, $ 8, cl. 8.
44 Id.
the White House issued a press release and fact sheet regarding the Executive Branch's stance on
the "patent troll" problem.a5 In the statement, the White House declared that it believes that
patent trolls "don't actually produce anything themselves,"46 and that the main strategy
employed by patent trolls is "to essentially leverage and hijack somebody else's idea and see if
they can extort some money out of them."a7 This understanding is consistent with the definitions
of patent troll discussed above. In addition to defining patent trolls, the White House also issued
a slate ofseven legislative suggestions and five executive actions that it believes should be
implemented in order to curb the patent troll problem.a8 Although the Executive Branch's
understanding ofwhat constitutes a patent troll is consistent with generally accepted definitions,
the White House's plan to solve the patent troll problem, as will be discussed below, is not
focused on the generally accepted core issue ofabusive patent litigation.
There has been previous debate surrounding whether the patent system should be dictated
by executive action and administrative law principles or, conversely, be subject to.iudicial
review.ae Although the President is attempting to eliminate patent trolls, and has not exceeded
his Constitutional powers by merely stating his policy objectives,so his entrance into the realm of
patent trolls is unlikely to bring about significant change or to benefit to the United States patent
system . Instead, many of the proposals, particularly those that have yet to be thoroughly
considered by congress, are more likely to hurt the patent system by reducing its efficiency and
a5 Press Release, The White House, Fact Sheet: White House Task Force on High-Tech patent Issues (June 4,201i)qvqilable qt httpJlwww.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/06/04/facr-sheet-white-house-task-forci-trigh-tectr-
patent-issues) [hereinafter llhite House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheetf.
46 ld.
4'Id.
48 ld.
ae See generally Orin S. Kerr, Article, Rethinking Palent Law in the Administrative State,42 WM AND MARy L. REV.
t27 (2000).
50 Previous Presidents haye made statements regarding patent policy, but only ra rely. see, eg, Kennedy,
Presidential Memorandum and statement on Government patent policy, 28 r'Eo. Rrc. t o,e+i (t eo:; laiscussingissues related to govemment acquisition ofpatent rights for inventions made as the result ofa govemment contract).
making it more difficult for small businesses, individual inventors, and other legitimate small
entities to seek, obtain, and exercise the rights associated with patent protection. Additionally,
many of the suggestions are likely to further compound the pre-existing problems facing the
American patent system, such as the incredible application backlog within the USPTO'I-'a
problem that has only been exacerbated by sequestrations2-as well as a record number of patent
cases being brought through the courts.53
This Comment argues that the Executive Branch's entrance into the patent troll hunt will
be ineffective at stopping patent trolls-perhaps even detrimental to the patent system-because
it does not address abusive litigation tactics. Furthermore, regulation of the patent system should
be reserved for Congress. Part II of this Comment provides a brief background to recent
attempts to limit patent trolls and discusses the Executive Branch's proposals which were first
offered in July 2013. Part III evaluates the merits of each of the Executive Branch's proposals
and the likely impact each will have on both the patent system and in ending abusive patent
litigation techniques often employed by patent trolls. Part IV of this Comment provides
alternative suggestions to help end abusive patent litigation without relying on presidential
intervention and suggests the Congress thoroughly consider these options. Part V of this
Comment concludes that the Executive Branch's proposals will, at best, only provide a marginal
solution to the patent troll problem, and that the patent system will be better served by
congressional intervention and consideration of ideas that have yet to be thoroughly explored.
5r As of December 2013, there 595,361 unexamined patents awaiting examination in the USPTO. The USPTO
maintains a dynamic webpage displaying various performance measures for patent examination. This webpage can
be accessed at http://wwww.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml.
52 Sequestration refers to the automatic budget cuts made in accordance with the Budget Control Act of 201I (S.
364, il2rh Cong. (2012)). Sequestration forced the patent system to experience a 5% budget reduction, as reported
in an OMB Report to the Congress on the Joint committee Sequestration for Fiscal Year 2013 (Mar. 1,2013),p. 12,
qvailsble at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/defaulVfiles/omb/assets/legislative-reports/ffl3ombjcsequestrationreport.pdf
53 See Pricewaterhouse Coopers LLP,2Ol3 Patent Litigation Study at 6, available at
hftp://www.pwc.com./en_US/us/forensic-services/publications/assets/2013-patent-litigation-study'pdf.
II. Background and Overview of Executive Actions and Proposed Legislation
A. Previous Attempts to Stop Patent Trolls
Congress has acknowledged that patent trolls pose a problem to the intellectual property
industry, and it has taken several affirmative steps aimed at curbing the patent troll problem.
Congress initially identified patent trolls as problematic and first attempted to stop patent trolls
when the House of Representatives proposed the Patent Reform Act (PRA) of 2005.s4 This piece
of legislation specifically targeted patent trolls by making it more difficult to obtain injunctive
relief in patent litigation matters.ss Although not implemented in 2005, this concept persevered
and was included as a part of the unenacted Patent Reform Acts of 2007s6 and 2OO9,s7 until it
was eventually made law by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act58 IAIA), which became fully
effective on March 16,2073.se
Although the AIA is most commonly noted for forcing the American patent system to
transition from a first-to-invent system to a first-inventor-to-file system,60 the law also may have
made it easier for patent trolls to file mass applications, shifting the burden to initiate patent
litigation onto legitimate inventive entities.6l Despite this, many of the provisions of the AIA
were subject to criticism, and commentators determined that it effectivety limited the rights of
small inventors by forcing them to race to the patent office in order to secure patent protection
54 H.R. 2798,109t Cong. (2005).
s5 Jeremiah Chan & Matthew Fawcett, Footsteps of the Parcnr Troll, l0INrELL. PRop. L. BuLL. l, 9 (2005) C,It
appears directed (in part) to tipping the scales against issuing an injunction where the plaintiff is not a competitive
entity with a business, as opposed to [a] purely financial, interest in its lawsuit.',)56H.R. 1908, lloftcong. (2007).
57 H.R. 1260, n 1tr Cong. (2009).
58 H.R. 1249,112ft Cong. (201l).
se Id.
60 See35 U.S.C. $ 100(i) (2012).
6r Paul R. Gupta & Alex Feerst, The US Pqtent system After the Leahy-Smith America lrwents Act,Eur..lNrElL.
PRoP. t{EV. 1,2072, at 60, 6l (2012).
9
for their inventions.62 Euid"nce of this assertion is provided by the fact that many large
corporations led the way in lobbying for the AIA to become law.63 These corporations include
big names such as Apple, Cisco, Google, HP, Microsoft, and Intel, all of which have impressive
patent portfolios.6a
In order to counteract some of the negative effects caused by stepping away from a first-
to-invent system, the AIA also provides smaller inventors with minor relief in the creation of a
new "micro-entity" status.6s By allowing certain individuals who certify their status as a small
entity66 to receive fees reduced by as much as 75 percent,6T Congress reduced the financial
burden faced by many small inventors who traditionally lack a strong financial backing when
applying for a patent. Due to the fact that certification of "micro-entity" status also requires that
a patent seeker has only filed a limited number ofpatents,68 Congress was also able to ensure that
patent trolls would not be able to easily abuse the benefits ofthis status by filing a large volume
ofapplications to create a portfolio ofnon-practiced inventions.
B. Presidential Intervention
Shortly after the AIA went into fulI effect on March 16,2013, the Executive Branch
issued a press release describing how it plans to solve the patent troll problem through five
Executive Actions and seven legislative suggestions.6e Despite the two broad categories of
suggestions, there is significant overlap between many of the proposed initiatives. This section
62 See, e.g, Jennifet L, Case, How the America lwents Act Hurts American Inventors and Weqkens Incentives to
Innovate,82 UMKC L. REv.29 (2013).
63 See Xuan-Thao N guye.I., Dynamic FederLlism and Patent Lqw Reform,85 IND. L.J.44,451 (2010).
64 ld.
65 35 U.S.C. $ 123 (2013).
uu The requiriments necessary for an inventive entity to be classified as a small entity permitting th€ payment of
small entity fees are outlined in 37 c.F.R. 1.27(a).
6? Certified small entities are eligible for a 50 percent fee reduction while certified micro entities are eligible for a 75
percent fee reduction. Se€ 35 U.S.C. $ 123 (2012).
68 35 U.S.C. $ 123(a)(2) (2012).
6e White House High-Tech Patent Issue Facl Sheet, supra note 45'
10
will briefly explain the Executive Actions and the Executive Branch's proposed legislation-
along with each item's intended effect on the patent system-in order to provide the background
necessary for meaningful evaluation ofhow these proposals are likely to actually affect both
patent trolls and innocent bystanders. Further discussion of the impacts of each proposal is
contained within Part III of this Comment.
The President's Executive Actions
Through its first Executive Action, the White House explained how it plans to implement
a "Real Party of Interest"T0 requirement for patent applicants and patent holders. This initiative
would require patent applicants and owners to regularly update ownership and assignment
information when practicing before the USPTO.TI Under the proposal, this information would
need to be provided whenever a new patent application is filed, a patent is issued, a patent is
assigned, or a patent maintenance fee is paid.
The Executive Branch's second action is aimed at "tightening functional claiming.,,72
This proposal intends to make it more difficult for an applicant who claims an abstract or overly
broad invention to be issued a patent. Under this provision, the USPTO will also be given
guidance on new training that will help patent examiners further scrutinize overly broad claims.73
This adds to the restrictions imposed by the AIA, which placed limitations on certain method
claims such as tax strategies.Ta
The third Executive Action hopes to "empower downstream users.',75 In addition to
targeting product makers and sellers, patent trolls sometimes also target the end-user ofan
70 White House High-Tech Patent lssue Fact Sheet, supra Bote 45.
7t ld
12 ld.
73 ld.
74. see.H.R-_1249 $ 14, I 126 cong. (201 I ); see a/so Nichelle closson, com me , Tax strotegt patents after the
A.mericqn lnyents Act: The Needfor Judicial Action,38 towA J. CoRp. L. l59 (2012).
1s White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fqct Sheel, supra rrote 45.
ll
allegedly infringing invention. For example, some trolls have chosen to target businesses that
use common technologies such as point-of-sale software76 and free public Wi-Fi.77 Another
patent troll has even claimed that any person or business who sends JPEG images via email has
infringed one of his patents.T8 In many of these cases, patent trolls usually target small mom-
and-pop retailers, hotels, or coffee shops that are unlikely to be fully aware of their legal rights.Te
This Executive Action aims to stymie these infringement claims by providing educational
materials to the public, which will explain the basic steps someone should take when an
infringement action is brought against him.
The White House's fourth Executive Action aimed at stopping patent trolls is to "expand
dedicated outreach and study."80 This scholarly provision intends to encourage intellectual
growth within the patent system. Specifically, it aims to foster ongoing correspondence and
roundtable discussions among the American patent system's stakeholders, including federal
agencies involved in the enforcement of patent rights such as the USPTO, the Department of
Justice, and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The White House intends to implement this
Executive Action by hosting "six months of high-profile events across the country to develop
new ideas and consensus around updates to patent policies and laws."Sl Furthermore, the White
House stated that it wishes to expand the USPTO's Edison Scholars Program by engaging more
academic experts to conduct research and share data that may have an impact on issues related to
76 Id.
77 Mike Masnick, Patent Troll Says Anyone IJsing WiFi Infringes; Won't Sue Individuals 'At This Stage',
Techdirt.com (Oct. 3, 2011, ll:28 AM),
http://www.techdirt.com/blog/wireless/articles/20 t I 1001/00365 41616llpatent-troll-says-anyone-using-wifi-
infr inges-wont- sue-individuals-this-stage. shtml.
78 Laura Sydell, Taking the Battle against Patent Trolls to the Public, NPR (Aug. 30,2013,5:21 PM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/alltechconsidered/2}13108130121727z}l4/taking-the-battle-against-patent-trolls-to-the-
public/.
7e See Gregory Thomas, Innovatio's Infringement Suit Rampage Expands to Corporate Hotels, THE PATENT
pxavrr.rsn (Sipt. 30, 2011), http://www.patentexaminer.or!2071/09/innovatios-infringement-suit-rampage-
expands-to-corporate-hotels/.
80 White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra note 45.
8t Id.
t2
abusive litigation.82 Unfortunately, as witl be discussed in greater detail below, these educational
efforts will likely fall short ofactually addressing the problems that stem from patent trolls'
abusive litigation tactics.
The fifth and final Executive Action proposed by the Executive Branch is to strengthen
the enforcement process of exclusion orders. This action takes aim at intemational patent
infringers. Cunently, when the Intemational Trade Commission (lTC) determines that an
imported or exported product is infringing another party's patent, it consults with United States
Customs and Border Protection-an agency of the United States Department of Homeland
Security-to enforce an exclusion order. Sometimes, however, only a minor product change can
be sufficient to allow an infringer to escape the scope ofthe exclusion order, thus bypassing it
completely.E3 This provision states that the United States Intellectual Property Office witl
investigate enforcement activities and work with the ITC on finding improvements that will help
make the process more efficient, effective, and transparent.8a
ii. The President's Legislative Proposals
In addition the White House's Executive Actions, President Obama also suggested seven
pieces of legislation. Many of these legislative proposals mirror the implementation specified in
the Executive Actions, and therefore, do not operate independently. For instance, both the
Executive Actions and legislative proposals contain provisions pertaining to the "real party of
interest," protecting end-users, and empowering the ITC. Despite this, there are several
legislative proposals that are not encompassed in the Executive Actions.
82 ld.
s_See Timothy Q. Li, Essay, Exclusion Is Not Automatic: Improving the Enforcement of ITC Exclusion Orders
Through Notice, a Test for Close Cases, qnd Civil penalties, E I GEo. Wesi. L. REv. I i55 (2013).8a White House High-Tech pqtent Issue Facl Sheet, supra note 45.
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The first proposed legislative action is related to the first Executive Action, in that it is
focused on providing transparency by creating a "real party of interest" standard within the
patent system.ss Although this proposal may seem novel, it has already been discussed in
Congress and was previously proposed in legislation such as the End Anonymous Patents (EAP)
Act.86 The EAP Act required that the real party of interest be identified at the time a new patent
is issued, at the time maintenance fees are paid, and within ninety days of any action in which the
ownership interest in a patent or a patent application is sold, granted, or conveyed.8T
Next, the White House states it would like to give courts more discretion when
determining whether a prevailing party in a patent case is entitled to fees.88 This would require
modiffing 35 U.S.C. $ 285, which covers sanctions in patent lawsuits. The Executive Branch
suggests adopting a standard similar to that which currently applies to copyright infringement
cases, where the courts have discretion to "allow the recovery of full costs by or against any
party other than the United States."8e Similar to the standard used for copyright infringementeo,
this modification would allow for the recovery of reasonable attomey's fees.
The President's third legislative suggestion is to expand the USPTO's transitional
program. el This would permit a wider range of challengers to petition for review of issued
patents before the Patent Trial and Appeals Board (PTAB).e2 The goal of this suggestion is to
make it easier for third-parties to challenge the validity of computer-enabled and software
patents.e3 The idea is that patent trolls who seek overly broad business method and computer-
85 Id.
86 H.R. 2024ll3th Cong. (2013).
87 Id.
88 White House High-Tech Pqtent lssue Fact Sheet, supra note 45.
8e l7 u.s.c. g sos (2012).
e0 Id.
et lfhite House High-Tech Patent lssue Fact Sheet, supro note 45.
e2 Id.
e3 Id.
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based patents would be targeted, their claims would be declared invalid, and they would then be
unable to exploit their patents against third-parties. Therefore, rather than targeting abusive
litigation, this proposal aims to make it more difficult to obtain a patent in the first place and
expands the scope ofchallenges currently facing the PTAB.e4
The fourth legislative proposal is markedly similar to the third Executive Action in that it
also intends to help protect end-users ofproducts.es This proposal aims to provide protection to
end-users who purchase and use a product for its intended purpose. The proposal also suggests
staying judicial proceedings against end users when a vendor, retailer, or manufacturer is also
being sued under the same allegations of infringement.e6 Therefore, while this proposal intends
to protect end-users from frivolous infringement actions, it truly just changes the party likely to
be sued by a patent troll. Admitted, this may protect innocent victims who cannot afford to put
on their own defenses, but it does not stop patent trolls from initiating abusive litigation,
although it may make them less confident in their litigation tactics.
The Executive Branch's fifth legislative suggestion is to change the ITC standard for
obtaining an injunction. Since the ITC is a federal agency and not a court, it does not always
follow the rules set forth by the Supreme Court and is not bound by Supreme Court decisions or
precedent.eT Despite this, aggrieved parties can file an appeal from an ITC decision in federal
court.es This creates an incredible strategic advantage for a patent troll who can simultaneously
pursue an alleged infringer in both the court system and the ITC by claiming that it has become
e4 Similarly to the USPTO, the PTAB is currently experiencing a severe back log ofex parte appeals. See USpTO
Data Visualization Center, strpra note 51.
o-5 llhite House High-Tech Patent lssue Foct Sheet- supra note 45.
e6 ld.
e7 See, e.g, Charles H. Koch, Jr., 2 Admin. L. & prac. g 5:67 (3d ed. 2010).
e8 See l9 U.S.C. g 1337(c) (2012).
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the victim of an "unfair trade practice."ee Additionally, the Executive Branch suggests that the
four-factor test used in eBay v. MercExchangeloo be adopted by the ITC to require a plaintiff to
show that that he has been irreparably harmed, that remedies available at law are inadequate to
compensate him for the alleged injury, that a remedy ofequity is permissible, and that the public
interest would not be disserved by the issuance ofa permanent injunction.l0l
A sixth legislative recommendation has the goal of stopping abusive lawsuits by
requiring that demand letters be more transparent.lo2 In order to implement this process, the
Executive suggests incentivizing the public filing ofdemand letters in such a way that they are
easily accessible and easily searchable to the public. This proposal is closely related to the "real
party ofinterest" recommendations found in the Executive Branch's first Executive Action and
first legislative proposal, and intends to enable the public to become more aware of the names of
businesses and persons who file a large volume of infringement actions.
The final legislative proposal intends to grant the ITC more flexibility in hiring
Administrative Law Judges.lo3 This proposal is likely being used to encourage the ITC to hire
additional judges so that it can meet the demands of the increased case load it has experienced in
recent years.l04 As will be discussed later, however, this proposal is largely unrelated to the
patent troll problem despite the possible benefits that are included.
ee See Colleen V. Chien, Patentb) Protectionist? An Empirical Analysis of Potent Cases at the Internqtional Trade
Commission,50 WM. & MARY L. REv.63 (2008) (discussing how patent trolls often make use ofthe court system
and the ITC simultaneously in order to bring an inllingement action).
'oo 547 U.S. 388 (2006).tot ld.
r02 White House High-Tech Pqtent lssue Fact Sheet, supra r,ote 45-
to3 Id.
rM From Fy 2000 to Fy 201lthe ITC'S Section 33? caseload for investigations into allegations ofunfair practices in
import trade has increased by over 530 percent. See Conversations with the Honorable Dick Thomburgh, Deanna
Tanner Okun, Paul Roeder, Washington Legal Foundation, Spring 2013, available qt
http://wwwjustic€.gov/atr/public/workshops/pae/comments/paew-0041b.pdf'
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III. Analysis of the Effects of the Executive Actions and Proposed Legislation
As discussed above, Congress has typically been left with the task of creating laws
related to the patent system because this power is specifically provided for in the United States
Constitution.ros This is one reason why it is particularly interesting that the White House has
decided to enter and police the patent realm. Not only is it rare for the President to explicitly
direct the policies and rules surrounding patent law,l06 but it may also be a cause for concem as
the Executive Branch may not have the proper knowledge or experience to bring about effective
changes within the intellsctual property system. Although the President's suggestions try to
cover many different aspects of the patent system, they lack a clear and defined focus.l07
Additionally, the Executive Branch's lack ofexpertise causes it to fail to adequately address the
most critical way in which patent trolls exploit the patent system: abusive patent litigation.
Furthermore, in acknowledging the severity ofthe patent troll problem, the President himself has
called on Congress-the appropriate body to address such an issue-to take the steps necessary
to put a stop to abusive patent litigation.l08
As discussed above, abusive patent litigation has significant implications for the United
States economy,roe and it is unlikely that the patent troll problem will fix itselfin the near future.
More likely, the problem will continue to expand until abusive litigation is effectively ended by
new legislation. Patent trolls are estimated to have accounted for approximately 62 percent of
ro5 U.S. CoNST. art. t, $ 8, cl. 8.
t.M See, e.g., Kennedy, Presidenlial Memorandum and Statement on Government Patent Pol icy, suprq 11ote 50.
r0? Ofthe seven legislative recommendations and five Executive Actions, many different areas ofihe patent system
are discussed, including ITC involvement, the basis on which patents should be granted, identiS/ing p;tent holde$
during the course of Iitigation, and providing education and protections to the puLlic. None of tijes-e directly
addresses limiting the number or making it more difficult for a party to initiate an abusive patent infiingemint
ac_tion. See White House High-Tech Patent Issue Fact Sheet, supra rlote 45.
r08 Barack Obama, President ofthe United States of America, Siate ofthe Union Address (Jan. 28,2014) (,.And let,s
pass a patent reform bill that allows our businesses to stay focused on innovation, not costly, needless Iiiigation.,,).
roe &e Bessen & M e\rer, suprq nole 33.
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patent litigation as of 2012.110 This constitutes approximately 2,900lawsuits per yearlll and
represents a significant increase over estimates from prior years.l12 Furtherrnore, patent trolls
often try to name multiple defendants in order to maximize their probability of recovery in
lawsuits via settlements, licensing agreements, or, more rarely, verdicts and judgments.l13 These
numbers emphasize the importance of ending abusive litigation practices, a sentiment echoed by
one of the CAFC's most prominent judges, Randall R. Rader.lla
In addition, many of the Executive Branch's suggestions have already been addressed by
Congress through proposed legislation. Once a piece of legislation is presented to Congress, it is
usually recommended to a committee that has specialized expertise in evaluating whether the
proposal will be effective and can be implemented in a manner such that its negative
consequences are minimized. This technique, rather than presidential intervention, is much more
likely to be effective in eliminating abusive patent litigation and will be discussed more
thoroughly in Part IV.
A. Proposals Affecting Patentee ldentification
Many of the White House's proposals are focused on greater transparency and more
effective identification of patent holders. The "real party of interest" requirements embodied in
the first Executive Action and first legislative proposal, along with encouraging demand letter
transparency in accordance with legislative recommendation six, are primarily focused on
preventing a patent troll from hiding within a "shell" entity.
rr0 See Colleen V. Chien, Patent Trolls by the Numbers, SaNra CLARA LAw DIGITAL COMM0NS (Mar. 3, 2013),
ov ail abl e at h@: I I digitalcommons.law. scu.edu/facpubs/609/.
ttt ld.
tt2 Id.
tt3 ld.
tt4 See, e.g., Randall R. Rader, Make Patent Trolls Pay in Court,NY TIMES OPINION PAGES (June 4, 2013)
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/opinion/make-patent-trolls-pay-in-court.html.
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Analysts throughout the intellectual property community anticipate that these provisions
will only have a "de minimis impact" in part because "patent trolls don't profit from
anonymity." l 15 Effective patent trolls view their activity as a business model, not as a game of
secrecy. Although it is true that patent trolls often do try to hide their identities through the use
of "shell" companies in an attempt to avoid counterclaims,l 16 trolls are not concemed with
whether third-parties know who they e, so long as they are still tuming a profit.l 17 This is
illustrated by the fact that although some of the most tenacious patent troll entities-such as
Intellectual Ventures, which is known to have over 1,200 shell companies with a worldwide
patent portfolio containing approximately 60,000 patentsllE-have received massive amounts of
negative publicity, continue to play the patent troll game of trying to obtain licensing fees
through abusive litigation based on illegitimate claims of patent infringement.
In addition to inadequately combating patent trolls, there is the also the possibility that
these provisions will have a negative impact on small inventive entities. For instance, the "real
party ofinterest" provisions may enable large companies to find smaller parties who legally hold
the rights to various inventions but wish to remain secret. Larger corporations may attempt to
use identifring information to their advantage by overpowering smaller companies with threats
ofcostly litigation orthe use of corporate espionage.lle Altematively, larger companies may
intentionally infringe against a smaller entity that they know does not have adequate resources to
protect its own patent rights. If a large company is infiinging a small inventor's invention, that
inventor may not have the financial capability to bring an infringement action, or he may simply
r15 Hsieh, sylvia. will obama's proposals Rein in patent Trolls? The Daily Record Newswire, wailable at
http://www.legalnews.cor/detroit/ I 3 77007l (quoting Anthony Biller).
I16 Daniel J. McFeely, Comment, An Argunent for Restricting the Patent Rights to Those lltho Misuse rhe u.S.
P.qtent System to Earn Money Through Litigqtion,40 ARtz. ST.L.f .2Bg, at2g4 ?OOS).t7 Id.
r18 Tom Ewing & Robin Feldman, The Gianrs Among IJs.2012 SrAN. TECH. L. REV. l, 24 e}l2).rre Corporate espionage refers to uncovering a compititor's trade secrets, business metlrods, inteliectual propemy, or
other secret information by dishonest means. See l8 U.S.C. $ lg3l (2012).
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choose not to bring an action because he is certain that he will not be able to win against a larger
company full of lawyers and financial resources.
Although larger companies may use the "real party of interest" requirement to their
advantage, they are not entirely immune to the possible negative effects ofthis provision. By
being forced to disclose the "real party ofinterest," companies may be forced to provide
information that exposes their otherwise confidential commercial business strategies, such as the
specific corporate structue used to manage their intellectual property. Therefore, larger
corporations may have their have their ability to implement effective intellectual property
management techniques limited.l20 These limitations may hurt these companies' economic
growth and add additional management burdens.
As a whole, "real party of interest" requirements do not effectively combat the patent
troll problem. Of course, these requirements allow a patent infringement defendant to have more
clarity in identifying the party who has sued him, but this does not stop an abusive infringement
lawsuit from being filed in the first place. Without doing anlthing to effectively reduce the
number of lawsuits patent trolls file, the patent troll problem cannot be adequately addressed
simply through greater transparency and "real party of interest" requirements.
B. Educational Efforts and End User Protections
A second broad category ofthe White House's proposals to stop patent trolls is aimed at
education. In many instances, the goal of education is to protect end users from abusive
litigation. While educating the public is a noble cause based primarily on good intentions, it is
r20 For an overview ofemerging intellectual property management techniques, see William W Fisher Ill & Felix
Oberholzer-Gee, Strategic Management oflntellectual Property An Integrated Apploach, CAl.. MCMT. REV.,
Special Issue on Intelleitual Proferty Management: In Search ofNew Practices, Strategies, and Business Models
(Feb. 17,2013).
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hard to see how these proposals will be able to effectively stop patent trolls from initiating
abusive litigation.
The public is not completely unaware of the problems associated with patent trolls.
Patent trolls and their abusive litigation tactics are often publicized in the media, thus creating
publicawareness.l2lOfcourse,itisimpossibletodocumentorpublicizeeveryinstanceof
abusive litigation filed by a patent troll, but the general public has been put on notice about the
tactics and effects of patent trolls. Furthermore, designation as a "patent troll" comes with a
largely pejorative meaning.l22 Even someone who is unfamiliar with the commonly used
definitions of patent troll would at least be able to ascertain the negative connotation associated
with the word "troll."
Within the intellectual property community, patent trolls receive even more scrutiny than
they do in society at large. Law review articles discussing patent trolls have been published
since the term first came into use. Patent-focused websites and blogs, such as Patently-O, have
thousands of usersl23 that actively discuss issues facing the patent system, including trolls. Many
ofthese users are patent examiners, registered patent agents, or licensed patent attorneys-all of
whom are active stakeholders in the intellectual property community. In many of these
conversations, strategies to end abusive litigation are discussed, and patent trolls are further
vilified for their abuse ofthe patent system.
Even ifeducation provides the general public with the knowledge necessary to evade a
patent troll, this effort will only go so far. Shortly after implementation, the general public may
I2r Simply searching for "patent trolls" on an Intemet news search engine yields a significant number ofresults
relatedto patent trolls, and a significant number ofthe results have negative connotations associated with them. S.ee,
e.g, Edward J. Black, Senate Needs to Stop Patent Trolls, Huffington post, (Feb.3,2014,3:04pM)
http://www.huffingtonpost.com./edward-j 
-black/senate-needs-to-stop-patent-trolls b 4696466.htm1.
122 Supra note 14.
r23 Patently-o advertises that it has over 19,000 daily subscribers. s€e http://www.patenllyo.com.
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have a slightly increased knowledge of how the patent system works and the threats that patent
trolls pose. This knowledge, however, does nothing to impede the efforts ofpatent trolls. Patent
trolls will still be able to file lawsuits in the same manner and volume that they do today, and the
only benefit to an unsuspecting infringement defendant is that he now knows the definition ofa
patent troll. Furthermore, many patent trolls are very profitable and can easily spend money on
expensive legal counsel or other expenditures to keep their business going, even if more
knowledgeable defendants become less willing to quickly back down or settle.l2a Because of
this, any educational efforts in place would require continuous updating in order to be relevant
and effective.
Educational efforts alone will not be able to end the abusive patent litigation used by
patent trolls, given that patent trolls are already an identified problem. Because of this, it is
unlikely that these efforts will have a significant impact, if any, on the abusive tactics commonly
employed by patent trolls in the near future. Despite these inadequacies, improving education
about the patent system and the dangers ofpatent trolls may be a worthwhile expenditure if
properly implemented. Rather than combating the patent troll problem, constant updating of
educational materials related to the patent system based on the input ofvarious stakeholders
could potentially provide a greater understanding ofthe American patent system as a whole and
encourage further innovation.
C. Tightened Functional Claiming
The President's suggestion to tighten functional claiming builds upon the AIA's efforts of
preventing overly broad patents from being issued in the first place. Although the patent
system,s integrity relies on the fact that only deserving inventions should receive patent
r2a See Schumer, szpra r,ole27.
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protection, current provisions already address this concem, requiring that a patent be novel,
useful, and non-obvious.l2s As discussed below, while it may be true that not all patents are truly
useful inventions in the eyes ofmany, the Executive Branch's suggestion to tighten functional
claiming is unlikely to stop patent trolls, and may pose a significant risk to small inventors
seeking patent protection.
Many patent trolls do not even create tleir own inventions. Instead, they acquire the
rights to a patent on the open market.126 Consequently, making it more difficult for certain types
of inventions to receive patent protection is unlikely to limit the effectiveness ofpatent trolls
because trolls will continue to purchase the rights to already issued patents. By purchasing
existing patents, larger patent trolls do not have to spend significant amounts ofmoney or
assume any of the risks associated with obtaining patent protection. If this provision were to
have any impact on patent trolls, it would be only on those holding a small number of self-made
inventions. Although these smaller entities may sometimes be patent trolls according to common
definitions, they are not at the root of the patent troll problem.
Moreover, stricter limitations on functional claiming will complicate the process by
which an inventor gets a patent. This provision would increase scrutiny from the USpTO and
require the inventor to take extra steps in preparing his application if he hopes to have a patent
issued. For instance, inventors and patent applicants would likely be required to establish
detailed glossaries explicitly defining even common terms, thus placing an additional burden on
both patent applicants and patent prosecutors. Furthermore-and perhaps even more detrimental
to the core tenents of the American patent system-under this proposal an unsophisticated
individual inventor who has filed his own patent application may have his invention denied not
r25See35 U.S.C. $$ l0l-l0l (20t2).
126 See, e.g., Daniel L McFeely, Commenl, An Argument for Reslricting the Pqtent Righrs b Those llho Misuse the
U.S. Patent System to Earn Money Through Litigation,40 Anz. Sr. t_.1. Zte, Ze+ iZO-OS;.
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because he has failed to meet the criteria for patentability, but rather, because he has used overly
broad language. These procedural complications not only affect inventors and patent
prosecutors, but they will also compound the USPTO's current backlog and staffing shortages.r2T
Overall, despites their intentions, proposals aimed at tightening functional claiming will
not effectively help cure the patent troll problem. Furthermore, the potential negative
consequences ofthese proposals are serious and may actually lead to both new and increased
problems and complications within the patent system.
D. ITC Reform
A number of the President's suggestions-legislative proposals five and seven as well as
the fifth Executive Action-focus on taking steps to reform the way in which the ITC handles
patent matters. Although these proposals contain elements that may beneflt the patent system,
they do not adequately address issues related to patent trolls abusive litigation strategies. For
instance, while granting the ITC more flexibility in its hiring processes may help the
organization better manage its caseload,l28 this does not directly affect patent trolls. Instead, this
would likely help address issues of intemational infringement, as the ITC would be able to reach
quicker resolutions and operate more efficiently. Despite this, hiring flexibility still does not
address patent trolls.
The only ITC provision that may help curb patent trolls and abusive litigation is the
suggestion that the ITC adopt the four-part test set forth in eBay, Inc. v. MercExchanget2e priot
to granting an injunction. Even with this provision, however, the overall effects ofthe efforts
aimed at reforming the ITC would be marginal, although, once again, the ITC would be able to
operate more efficiently and expedite the way in which it handles issues related to unfair trade
r2TUSPTo Dashboard supra note 51.
128 Conversations szpra note 104.
'2e 547 u.s. 388 (2006).
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practices. Unfortunately, this does not directly address the issues associated with patent trolls.
Luckily, however, despite the shortcomings and negative consequences of several of the
Executive's other proposals, the measures involving changes to the ITC do not have significant
negative impacts on small inventors or the overall patent system as a whole and would likely
produce several benefits.
IV. ProposedAlternatives
The Executive Branch's proposals include several good ideas, but will be largely
ineffective at actually stopping patent trolls and their abusive litigation strategies. Although the
President does have a cabinet in place that can advise him about the needs ofvarious govemment
agencies and entities, the ability ofthis cabinet to effectively assess and manage these needs
pales in comparison to Congress. With over fortyl30 Congressional committees subdivided to
create over one hundred13l congressional subcommittees,l32 Congress has the unique ability to
hold hearings in which it can obtain input from various stakeholders, thus enabting its members
to make informed decisions regarding proposed changes, and providing lawmakers with access
to a wide variety of differing points of view. This oversight allows not only for broad reform,
but for individual elements of patent reform to be chosen in a piecemeal manner, which is likely
a better approach to effectively evolving and moderating the patent system.l33 Furthermore, as
discussed above, congress is explicitly granted power over the patent and copyright systems by
'30 The United States House of Representatives has twenty-one committees. The United States Senate has tweniy-
one committees. There are also fivejoint committees. A full list ofcunent Congressional committees can be
accessed at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/commitees.
rrrThe United States House of Representatives has ninety-five subcommittees. The United States Senate has sixty-
eight subcommittees. 1d
r32 Congressional subcommittees are used to consider the details and specifics ofa maner and then report back to the
full committee with their results. See 5 U.S.C.S. Appx. S 5 (2013).
r33 See christopher Norton, Retired Fed. Cir. Chief lJrges piecemeal pqlenr Reforn, Law360 (lat. 12,201l,
5: l8PM) http://www.law360.com/iplarlicles/2l9706hetired-fed-circ-chief-urges-piecemeal-paient-reform.
25
the United States Constitution,l34 and the other branches ofthe federal govemment should not
usurp this power.
Despite the Executive Branch's well-intentioned efforts to put an end to patent trolls,
there are other alternatives available, which do not put small inventors at a disproportionate
disadvantage, do not place significant burdens on the USPTO, and can be more effective in
deterring abusive litigation practices. This section will discuss legislative efforts put forth by
Congress to stop patent trolls, proposals aimed at reducing the burden faced by smaller inventive
entities, altemative policing methods to catch patent trolls, and techniques available to legitimate
patent holders that wish to bring a valid infringement action to distinguish themselves from
patent trolls.
A. Legislative Efforts
The most traditional way in which Congress can attempt to modifu patent law and the
patent system is through legislation. At any given time, there may be thousands of bills present
before Congress.l3s Each is presented, evaluated by a committee or subcommittee, and
ultimately approved or discarded due to votes in each house ofCongress.136 Then, the law is
either enacted by the President's signature or vetoed.l3T As will be discussed, Congress's
attempts to stop patent trolls have focused primarily on issues related to abusive patent litigation.
Conversely, as argued in this Comment, the Executive's focus does not sufficiently address
abusive patent litigation, and instead, focuses on altemative methods that are unlikely to harm
patent trolls.
r34 U.S. CoNST. art. I, $ 8, cl. 8.
r35 As ofNovember 4,2}l3,there are 5,969 bills currently before Congress. The status ofbills and resolutions can
be tracked at http://www.govtrack.us/congress,tills.
136 See The Legislative Process: How a Bill Becomes a Law and Legislative Terms, National Mentoring Partnership
(Sept.20l0).
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i. Saving High-Tech Innovators From Egregious Legal Disputes Act of20l3
Perhaps the most effective method to stop patent trolls and the abusive litigation they
often unjustly initiate involves the incorporation of several provisions contained in the "saving
High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes (SHIELD) Act of 2013,"138 which was
originally brought before Congress in2012. Although the original SHIELD Act was not
enacted, the Act was amended to be more inclusive ofnon-software and non-computer-related
patents and was reintroduced in 2013.r3e The SHIELD Act was referred to the Subcommittee on
Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Intemet in April of2013, but a vote on the bill has yet to
take place.lao
The SHIELD Act is narrowly focused on ending abusive patent litigation. The Act
includes a provision requiring that a party bringing a patent infringement or patent invalidation
lawsuit must post a bond, the amount of which is determined by the court, to cover the costs of
the litigation.lal By requiring a bond, parties would likely be hesitant to file an infringement
lawsuit unless they were certain that they would be successful, thus reducing the overall number
of infringement actions. Although this provision may appear to create a burden on small
inventors wishing to exercise their rights in an infringement suit, there are several exceptions to
the bond requirement, easing the burden on certain inventive entities.
Original inventors,l42 original assignees,la3 patentees who can provide documentation
that they have taken significant steps or made a significant investment in using the patent,laa
'r8 H.R.6245, I l2s Cong. (2012).
r3e H.R. 845, I136 Cong. (2013).
r40 H.R. 845 Actions, I l3s Cong. (201 3 ), avaitable at htrpllbeta.congress.gov/bill/l I 3th.rhouse-bill/845/actions
r4r H.R.845(b), I l3s Cong. (2013).
'4'H.R. 845(dXt), I136 cong. (2013).143 Id.
r14 H.R. 845(dX2), I 13h Cong. (2013).
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universities, la5 and other recognized technology transfer organizationsl46 are all exempt from the
bond requirement. Additionally, even in instances where a plaintiff fails to meet one of these
criteria, the court is granted the discretion to determine whether a bond should still be
assessed.l4T This allows a court to evaluate whether a party has a legitimate claim or is actually a
patent troll who is bringing a frivolous or abusive lawsuit prior to initiating a bond requirement.
The Executive Branch's suggestions do not contain, and do not communicate a need for, the
judicial discretion necessary to ensure faimess in patent litigation.
Overall, the proposed implementation ofthe SHIELD Act presents a unique balance that
is likely to reduce the number offrivolous patent infringement and patent invalidation lawsuits,
while simultaneously preserving the rights of small inventors and non-profit innovators. By
reducing the number of lawsuits, a bond provision such as that contained in the SHIELD Act
could effectively reduce the patent troll problem and decrease caseload burdens before the PTAB
and other courts. The general public would no longer be as severely threatened by patent trolls,
and small inventors would not have their rights restricted or dissolved. In conjunction with other
possible solutions, a bond requirement could become the beginning of the end ofthe patent troll
problem.
ii. Patent Abuse Reduction Act
A second piece ofproposed legislation that is cunently before Congress and is also aimed
at reducing abusive patent litigation is the "Patent Abuse Reduction (PAR) Act of 2013,"r48
'45 H.R. 845(dX3XA), I l3e Cong. (2013).
146 H.R. 845 (dX3XB), I l3ih Cong. (2013).
I47 H.R. 845(b), I l3h Cong. (2013).
r4E S. 1013, I l3s Cong. (2013).
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which was presented in May of 2013lae and has been referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary.lso The PAR Act introduces advanced pleading requirements, sets forth procedures for
joinder ofparties, places restrictions on the discovery process, defines relevant evidence, and
allows courts to award the prevailing party reasonable costs and expenses, including attomey's
fees, in certain situations.lsr Similar to the SHIELD Act, the PAR Act includes a bond
provision, but this is limited to requiring a party to post bond only to cover the anticipated costs
ofdiscovery when that party requests discovery outside the scope ofthe PAR Act.r52
Like the SHIELD Act, the bond provision could deter abusive litigants. Unfortunately,
the PAR Act's use ofa bond requirement is not as elegant as the SHIELD Act's because it does
not provide the same balance used to protect the rights of small and individual inventors. The
PAR Act demonstrates that although there are some general concepts-such as bond
provisions-that may seem to help address the patent troll problem, implementation is crucial,
Therefore, legislators should focus on passing a bond provision similar to that ofthe SHIELD
Act, which provides relief for small inventive entities.
iii. Patent Litigation and Innovation Act
The Patent Litigation and Innovation (PLI) Act of 20l3rs3 is yet another piece of
legislation currently before congress with the goal of stopping patent trolls from engaging in
abusive litigation. The PLI Act sets forth new standards in pleadings, requiring a plaintiff in a
patent infringement case to fully identify the claims allegedly infringed, to specify clear
instances of infringement, and to disclose the "real party of interest." Although the pLI Act,s
"real party ofinterest" may seem similar to that proposed by the Executive Branch, it is
lll!":^q:rrl:1fl lecord. 1t3dCongress, l.,Session, Issue: Vol. 159,No.73 Daity Edirion, page s 3.,63_3765.,u S. I0I 3' I I36 Cong. (2013), Actions, available qt http://beta.congress.gov,rbilUl i3th/senai"-Ul lt o t:ltltr"r.15r s, lol3, I l3n Cong. (2013).
r52 S.1013 Sec. a @)(3XB)(ii)(II), I l3s Cong. (2013).
r53 H.R.2639, l13h Cong. (2013).
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markedly different in that rather than requiring identification ofthe "real party of interest"
whenever the patent is discussed before the USPTO, it only requires disclosure at the
commencement of an infringement action.
This nuance mitigates many ofthe negative consequences ofthe President's "real party
of interest" requirement that were previously discussed, while still maintaining the overall goal
ofpreventing patent trolls from hiding behind a "shell" during the course of patent litigation.
Furthermore, while the PLI Act would make the requirements for pleadings in a patent
infringement case stricter, they are not complex or difficult to decipher. This is an important
distinction because strict, yet simple, pleading requirements do not place a significant burden on
a party attempting to bring a legitimate patent infringement action.
The PLI Act also takes steps to simplifu the discovery process by limiting discovery
material to core documents such as identifying information and documentation specific to the
operation ofthe alleged infringing invention.rsa If enacted, the PLI Act would also limit
discovery until claim constructionl55 has been completed by the court during the course ofa
Markmants6 heaing.l5T Currently, patent trolls sometimes abuse the discovery process by
requesting millions ofdocumentsrs8 in an attempt to pressure the opposing party into settling the
lawsuit.r5e The imposition of discovery limitations as proposed by the PLI Act would
effectively disarm patent trolls ofone oftheir most effective weapons, and therefore, reduce their
overall success rates.
154 ld
r55,,Claim construction" refers to "the interpretation and construction ofpatent claims, which define the scope ofthe
patentee's rights under the patent," which is a process carried out by the court. See Markman v. Westview
lnstruments, Inc.,52 F.3d967,970 
- 
71 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
t56 ld
157 H.R.2639, I l3th Cong. (2013).
158 Abasiye Pqtent Litigiion: The Impact on Americqn Innovqtion & Jobs, And Potentiql Solutions Before the S.
Coum. On Courts, lnillectual Property and the Internet, I 136 Cong. (2013) (statement of John Boswell, Senior
Vice President and General Counsel, SAS).
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iv. Other Legislative Proposals
In addition to the bills culrently before Congress discussed above, there are several other
pieces ofproposed legislation that encompass similar ideas aimed at combating patent trolls.
These bills include the Patent Innovation Protection Act,l60 the Stopping Offensive Use of
Patents (STOP) Act,r61 and the Innovation Act.162 Although many ofthese acts do include ideas
suggested by the Executive Branch, they also serve as evidence that Congress can effectively
develop legislation that will help put an end to abusive patent litigation without the help of
Presidential intervention.
Additionally, several state legislatures have recently started to consider or enact bills that
take affirmative steps at combating patent trolls at a more local level.163 The success ofthese
laws has not yet been determined, however, and the first instance ofa state law being used to
prosecute an abusive patent troll only occurred in May of 2013.ls Furthermore, some
commentators raise concerns that state-based patent regulation may be preempted by federal
'60 H.R. 3349, I l3'h Cong. (2013). The Innovation Protection Act aims ro give the USPTO more flexibility in its
budget by creating a separate fund structure. The Act allows the Dtector ofthe USPTO to use funds received from
fees without the same limitations as funds received from taxpayers.
'6' H.R. 2639, I l3th Cong. (2013). The Stopping Offensive Use ofPatents Act aims to make improvements to the
transitional program for covered business method patents.
'62 H.R. 3309, I136 Cong. (2013). The lnnovation Act aims to heighten pleading requirements in patent
infringement cases, educate small businesses on how to protect themselves from abusive patent litigation, and place
limitations on discovery.
163 Vermont was the first state to pass a law targeting patent trolls and abusiye patent litigation. The bill, which is
known as the Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringement Act aims to end frivolous patent infringement lawsuits
while not interfering with federal patent law and legitimate patent infiingement actions. See 9 V.i.A. $$ 4195-4199(2013)- Nebraska Attomey General Jon Bruning has "declared war" on patent trolls and has given pubil ruppon to
the Nebraska Patent Abuse Prevention Act, which is currently being considered the Nebraska-legislature. See
Timothy B. Lee, Nebras*a's Attorney General has Declered War on Patenl Trolls, THE WAsHTNGToN posr (Sept.
I2, 2013, 8:50 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com,/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/12lnebraskas-attomey-geneial-
has-declared-war-on-patent-trolls/. See also Legislalure ofNebraska, One Hundred Third Legislature, Second
Session, REQ 03798, NPN l2l5/13. Maine has also considered a bill similar Vermont,s Badiaith Assertions of
Patent Infringement Act to target patent trolls and end abusive patent litigation. See Mal Leary, Maine Lawmakers
Consider Limiting Palent Trolls, Main public Broadcasting Netw ork ea;. 2,2014)
h_ttp://www.mpbn.nen/Home/tabid/36/ctwiewrtem/mid,/53 47 rltemrdl3r 557 /Default.aspx.ra Complaint available online at
http://www.atg.state.vt.us/assets/filesA/ermont%o2\vo/o21MpHJ%20Technologies%20complaint.pdf.
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patent law.l6s Pending the success of these state-based patent troll laws, other states may also
continue implementing similar pieces of legislation.
The number of proposed bills addressing patent trolls demonstrates that combating
abusive patent litigation is something that Congress is seriously considering. Novel techniques
such as state-based legislation go further to show the impact of the patent troll problem, as well
as the creativity that lawmakers have used in order to develop more effective ways of addressing
the patent troll issue. As time goes on and more legislators develop an increased appreciation of
the patent troll problem, even more bills are likely to be written, perhaps with even more creative
strategies aimed at reducing abusive patent litigation.
B. USPTO Review of Infringement Claims
Another way in which abusive patent litigation can be stopped is through more careful
monitoring of patent infringement lawsuits by the USPTO. Senator Charles Schumer and former
Senator Jon Kyl believe that requiring the USPTO to evaluate and certify patent infringement
claims prior to the commencement of a lawsuit will effectively reduce abusive patent
litigation.l66 Reflecting this theory, Senator Schumer has proposed a bill known as the Patent
Quality Improvement Act of 2013.167 Since this approach focuses on the litigious aspects of the
patent system, but also requires USPTO action, it can be considered a "hybrid approach" to
t6s See Thomas Carey, Patent Trolls in the Crosshairs: Vermont's Aggressive Stance and the Emerging Federal
Response, LEXTSNEXTs (Aug. I, 2013, 4: lOPM), http://www.lexisnexis.com/legalnewsroom/intellectual-
property/b/patent-law-blog/archive/20 I 3/08/0 1 /patent-trolls-in-the-crosshairs-vermont-39-s-aggressive-stance-and-
itre-e.e.ging-federal-response.aspx (discussing whether the Vermont law is "stillborn" because of federal
preemption).
itr Ingrid Lunden, Senotor Charles Schumer Targets Patent Trolls, lYants USPTO to Review Infringement Suits
Befoie they Head to Court,Tech Crunch (May 1,2013) http://www.techcrunch.com/2013/05/01/senator-charles-
scLumer-plans-bill-for-uspto-to-review-patent-troll-suits-before-they-head-to-courV.
167 S. 866 I l3th Cong. (2013).
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solving the patent troll problem. Because of this distinction, this Comment considers it
separately from other legislative actions discussed above.
In addition to cutting down on frivolous patent infringement lawsuits, Senator Schumer's
bill would also give examiners at the USPTO an opportunity to take a second look at an issued
patent when a lawsuit is initiated to determine whether the patent is truly valid.r68 By reviewing
a patent a second time, an examiner may realize something that was missed during the first
review that effectively invalidates the patent, and prevents a lawsuit from beginning.
Furthermore, this strategy does not create an additional bar to obtaining a patent; therefore, it still
rewards small inventive entities for actual ingenuity and technological contributions.
Thus far, Senator Schumer's bill has received positive feedback from patent industry
analysts.l6e Some view this approach to be a similar, but better altemative to fee shifting,
because fee shifting may still scare parties into settling lawsuits rather than entertaining the idea
of engaging in an expensive legal battle.rT0 With this proposed strategy, however, an innocent
defendant in an abusive litigation proceeding would not be forced to settle right away because
the lawsuit may be deemed invalid at the onset of litigation. Therefore, this approach would be
more effective in actually preventing abusive litigation and frivolous lawsuits because it would
make it impossible for a suit to commence without the USpTO,s stamp of approval.
There are several possible downsides to this proposal, however. First, by requiring
USPTO involvement, the organization is further burdenedrTl because it must train staffon the
mechanics of this approval process-a process which may also be subject to a large volume of
requests. Furthermore, by requiring that the USPTO approve lawsuits, smaller inventive entities
168 ld.
t6e Se1, e.S, Joe Mullin, Finally, q Bill to End patent Trolting, AF(STE]HNT.A (Ocr.23,2013, 5:34 pM)
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r7o S. 866 I l3m Cong. (201l).
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may experience increased difficulty when trying to assert their patent rights via an infringement
lawsuit. In order to account for this possible consequence, if enacted, this bill should make use
of the fee structure and "micro-enti1y" status put in place by the AIA.l72 This structure would
prevent small patent holders from incurring additional financial burdens when filing an
infringement claim.
Ifproperly implemented,lT3 taking into account the circumstances surrounding not only
large corporations with expansive patent portfolios, but also the individual and other small
inventors, this proposal would likely reduce the thousandslTa of lawsuits brought by patent trolls
each year. There are risks, however, associated with this bill, and like all legislation, it should be
carefully considered prior to congressional approval.
C. "Vigilante" Patenl Justice
Another interesting technique to reduce abusive litigation that simultaneously stops
infringers and gives patent trolls a waming involves the reduction oflitigation all together by
allowing patentees-particularly large corporations with expansive patent portfolios-to self-
police against infringers. Rather than suing a patent infringer and commencing a lengthy and
expensive litigation process, a company can take steps to stop the infringer without pursuing
legal action. For instance, Apple has recently made use ofa "buy-back" program to repurchase
infringing products from customers who have already purchased the item.l7s Apple's program
17,35 U.S.C. $ 123 (2012).
r?3 Some analysts suggest that combining this act with the SHIELD Act would cut down on the most egregious
patent troll lawsuits.-See, e.g, Mike Masnick, Chuck Schumer to Introduce Patenl Reform bill to Make it Cheaper
to Fight Back Against Patent rol/s, TECH DIRr (May 1, 2013, 7:52 AM)
http:Twww.techdirt.com,&log/imovation/articles/20130430 D2l52622896lchtck-schumer-to-introduce-patent-
reform-bil l-to-make-it-cheaper-to-fi ght-back-against-f olls. shtm l/.
r7a See Chien, szpra note I 10.
r75 Apple has bein accepting returns ofUSB adapters produced by third parties since August 16, 20l3 ln exchange
for a clunterfeit or third party adapter, Apple allows auser to puchase an Apple USB power adapter at a reduced
price. Further information regarding the details of Apple's program is available at
irttp://www.apple.com/support/usbadapter-takeback/ (last visited Nov 4, 2013)'
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focuses on recovering counterfeit power adapters for the iPhone, iPad, and iPod. Apple claims
that these counterfeit products may pose legitimate safety concems-a claim supported by
allegations that a Chinese flight attendant was fatally electrocuted by a counterfeit device.rT6 In
exchange for the infringing product, the company could choose to give the consumer the real
product or a credit which could be used towards the purchase ofthe real product.
Although the idea of companies pursuing "vigilante justice" in order to maintain their
patent rights may be unsettling to some, this tlpe of strategy has three key benefits. First, it
helps remove "knock-off' products which, in some industries, may raise significant safety
concerns. Second, programs such as these can provide a company with a significant public
relations boost.r77 Finally, this strategy provides a non-litigious option to companies who wish
to fight back against infringers but wish to differentiate themselves from the patent trolls who are
known for often utilizing abusive litigation techniques. By pursuing a nonJitigious remedy,
large companies with legitimate infringement claims avoid burdening the courts. Additionally,
these types of programs do nothing to hurt the intellectual property rights of legitimate small
inventors, but they do send a significant message to unlawful infringers that their infringement
will not be tolerated.
D. Working Requirements and Compulsory Licenses
All ofthe proposals discussed above do not provide an immediate or complete solution to
the problems surrounding patent trolls. Individually they may improve the patent system by
restructuring several small areas, but the patent system's current organization still allows for
llt l,: l"l! Mozer, Apple Investigates china iphone Death A egqtions, wALr. sT. J. cHINA REALTTME REpoRr(July l5, 2013, 5:59 PM), http:/,6logs.wsj.com./chinarealtim e/2013107 /15/apple-investigates-china-lptrone-death-
allegations/.
r?See Adam Pasick, Apple's iPhone Charger Take-back Progrqm is Genius pR-and it May Even Boost the Bottom
,rne, QrjARTz (Au9.7,2013),httpr/qz.corn/rr2722rappres-ifhone-charger-tare-ua.t 
-program-ir-g"rirr1.--o-it
may-even-boost-the-bottom-line/.
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patent trolls to operate. This problem may be more efficiently alleviated, however, through the
institution ofa working requirement and compulsory license system that only guarantees
continued protection to patentees who actually use or produce products or services covered by
their patents. Under a working requirement, Congress could mandate that a compulsory license
must be granted to anyone who wishes to use a patent that is not currently practiced, used, or
produced by the patent's inventor or assignee. Thus, those who wish to use a patented
technology that is not being practiced by its inventor have the right to do so while the patent
holder receives financial compensation for the use of his invention.
The idea of a working requirement is not new or novel. Many countries outside the
United States already make use of working requirements and compulsory licenses within their
local patent systems.lTE In fact, working requirements are included in the Patent Cooperation
TreatylTe (PCT), an intemational agreement to which the United States is a party. Specifically,
the PCT mandates that no compulsory license be denied to anyone wishing to use a patent that
has not been used or produced by the patentee within the past four years or within four years of
its filing date.lE0 Any compulsory license granted under this provision is non-exclusive and non-
transferrable, unless the transfer occurs as part of the sale ofan entire business enterprise.l8l The
idea ofa working requirement is not universally accepted however, as other pieces of
intemational legislation, such as the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rightsl82 (TRIPs Agreement), have stated that working requirements should not be
r78 See Association ofPatent Law Firms, Compulsory License Provisions Across Europe,http:llwww.avidity-
ip.com/assets/pdflpageview 20070802161505.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2014).
,i, patent Cooperaiion Treaty art. 5, June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231 replinted in 9 I.L.M. 978
(1970) (hereinafter PCI).
t|o ld.
t8t Id.
r82 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects oflntellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Estab-lishing the world Trade organization, 33 I.L.M. 1 197 (1994) (hereinafter 7R1Ps ,4 greement).
36
instituted except in exceptional circumstances.ls3 Despite this provision ofthe TRIPs
Agreement, however, many European countries continue to make use of working requirements
and compulsory licenses.
Currently, the only embodiment of a working requirement within the American patent
system is the maintenance fee that a patentee must pay to the USPTO every five years.l8a Ifthe
fee is not paid, the patent will lapse, and protection will no longer be granted.l8s The purpose of
the maintenance fee is to encourage a patent holder to make economical use of his patent. By
eliminating the maintenance fee and simultaneously instituting a working requirement via a
compulsory license system, patent holders would still be encouraged to practice their patents,
and the patent trolls who do not actually make or use patented technologies would be stripped of
much of their power. Instead of being able to theaten alleged infringers with costly lawsuits,
patent trolls would now be forced to comply with the terms of a compulsory license agreement.
Furthermore, this provision would not increase the difficulty ofobtaining a patent or make a
patent completely worthless if it is not practiced; non-practicing patentees would still be
compensated through a set lee schedule for compulsory licenses.
A compulsory license system may actually benefit many small entities and individual
inventors as well. currently, ifa small inventor's patent is being infringed, he may be hesitant or
unable to bring a lawsuit against the infringer because of the associated costs. Under a
compulsory license system, however, a patentee would no longer have to file a lawsuit in order
to be compensated for the use of his invention, but instead, could likely exercise his rights
through an administrative action. This aspect could be implemented in a fashion similar to the
r83 M-ichael LaFlame, Jr., The European patent system: An overyiete qnd critique,32 Hous. J. INT,L L. 605, 610(2010).
t&4 See 37 C.F .R. 1.27(a).
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European model of compulsory licenses, whereby third-parties simply apply to their national
patent authority to seek and obtain a license.l86 Furthermore, the reduction in the number of
patent infringement lawsuits brought on behalf of both patent trolls and more legitimate entities
would help alleviate the stress currently facing the court system and increase overall judicial
efficiency.
Although it is likely that patent trolls would be negatively affected by the institution of a
working requirement and compulsory license system, other legitimate entities may also oppose
the implementation of the associated stipulations. For example, many colleges, universities, and
other research institutions often develop new patentable technologies but do not practice the
inventions themselves. Instead, they license their patents and use the proceeds to continue other
educational and research efforts. When their patents are infringed, however, these institutions
often file lawsuits that are very similar in nature to those brought by patent trolls, and because of
this, some colleges and universities have even argued against patent reform aimed at patent
trolls, claiming that research institutions could suffer negative consequences as well.l8i These
organizations are not patent trolls, however. Instead, they often serve as leaders in new
technology development and it is important that their activities are not discouraged or
constructively stopped by the implementation of a working requirement.lSs Therefore, if a
working requirement were to be added to the United States patent system, lawmakers should
186 Andrew C. Mace, TNPs, eBay, and Deniol of Injunctive Relief: Is Article 3l Compliance Everything?, l0
CoLUM. Sct. & TECH. L. REV. 232 Q009).
r87 Timothy B. Lee, Patent Trolls Hove a Surprising Ally: IJniversities, THE WASHINGTON Posr (Nov. 30,2013,
I I :05 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com,/blogs/the-switch,/wp l2O13ll I /30/patent-trolls-have-a-surprising-ally-
universities/.
184 11r. USPTO reports that academic institutions account for approximately 4.3 percent of issued patents, and this
number has risen ionsistently from when it was 0.2 percent in 1985. See UNttEo Srerss PRreNr & TRADEMARK
oFFrcE, U.S. CoLLEGES AND UNrvERSrrrES-Urnriy PersNr GRANrs, Cal-sNoan YEARS 1969-2012, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/aclido/oeip/tafluniv/univ-toc.htm (Mar. 26,2014).
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consider including an exemption for these organizations similar to the exemptions provided in
several other pieces ofpending legislation discussed above.
Despite its potential effectiveness, a working requirement is not something that has been
thoroughly explored by Congress. Due to the benefits discussed above, however, the
development ofa working requirement and compulsory license system is an idea that warrants
significant consideration. Unlike many ofthe President's currently proposed actions and some
ofCongress's pending legislation, a working requirement targets the heart of the patent troll
problem. Instead of attacking ancillary aspects of how patent trolls abuse the patent system,
working requirements eliminate significant amounts ofabusive patent litigation brought by non-
practicing patentees and patent trolls. Therefore, Congress-not the Executive Branch-should
take the time and effort to explore the benefits and possible consequences involved in the
institution of a working requirement and compulsory license schema within the United States
patent system.
E. Other Alternative Methods
There are a myriad of other ways in which the patent system can be modified to deal with
the patent troll problem. Several other suggestions from within the intellectual property
community include encouraging lawyers to develop expertise in patent defense strategies.l89
encouraging patent defense attomeys to operate on a contingent fee basis,leo joining defendants
r8e See Chien, szpra note 10.
tq Id.
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in order to team up against patent trolls,lel and encouraging victims of abusive patent litigation to
fight, rather than settle, to reduce the overall success rate of patent trolls.le2
Others suggest f,rxing the patent system by making it more difficult to obtain a patent by
placing restrictions on how continuation applications can be filed.le3 Unfortunately, plans such
as these do not take into account the current number of valid patents or the devious nature of
patent trolls. Additionally, as discussed above, placing further obstacles in the way of obtaining
patent protection may have numerous negative consequences, such as denying legitimate
inventions patent protection.
Despite the specific implementation, however, almost all possible patent troll elimination
strategies have various pros and cons that should be carefully evaluated prior to implementation.
And, as discussed above, this implementation should not be mandated by the Executive Branch.
Instead, attempts to reduce the negative impact of patent trolls should come from the body
properly situation to make changes to the patent system: Congress.
V. Conclusion
Patent trolls pose a significant threat to the integrity and efficiency of both the patent and
court systems. They bring frivolous lawsuits, not because they care about their inventions, but
because they want to make money. They undermine parties who are faced with legitimate patent
infringement issues. They create unnecessary burdens for courts tasked with hearing patent
infringement cases. They also threaten an American economy that has a significant stake in
tet Id.
re2 pascall-Emmanuel Gobry, How to Get Rid of Patent Trolls for Good, BustNESS INSIDER (Aug. 17, 2011 3:16
AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how-to-get-rid-of-patent-trolls-for-good-2011-81.
re3 See James Bessen, The Power of No, (Dec.4,2013,9:45AM)
hffp://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense l2013l12lthe_simple-fix-that-could-heal-theiatent-system'
single.html
40
patent-intensive industries and intellectual property in general.lea These problems cannot go
unaddressed.
Despite the problems that patent trolls introduce and the good intentions displayed by the
White House's entrance into the hunt for patent trolls, the Executive is not the appropriate branch
of the federal govemment to address these issues. Patent trolls and the myriad of potential
problems they cause should be assessed and dealt with by Congress, which not only has
explicitly enumerated jurisdiction over patent-related issues,res but is also in a better position to
regulate and continually modemize the American patent system.
The patent system, as with all legal entities, must continue to evolve in order to address
the challenges ofa constantly changing economy and society.le6 This evolutionary process
should request and respect the input ofall stakeholders including Congress, the USPTO, patent
agents, patent attomeys, patent examiners, and inventors large and small, public and private.
These stakeholders also have a duty to seriously consider how the effects ofthe patent system's
evolution will impact those who routinely use and rely on the system in addition to its impact on
the American economy and the American inventor's way of life.
For now, it is unlikely that the patent troll problem will be stopped by a wizard's magical
spell or a witch's special potion. Instead, the patent troll problem will need to be continually
addressed by a much less supematural body: Congress. Although there are many possible
strategies available that could be used in the war on patent trolls, Congress has not yet taken the
time to consider them all. As time goes on, however, the same creativity that inspires inventors
rea Economics and Statistics Administation & United States Patent and Trademark Office, lntellectual properry and
the U.S. Economy: lndustries in Focus, (Mar.2012), mailable at
http://www.uspto.gov/news/publications/lP_Report March_20l2.pdf(explaining the estimated financial impacts of
intellectual property on the US economy).
Ie5 U.S. CONS.I. art. I, $ 8, cl. 8.
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to develop new and exciting technologies may also be the "magical" inspiration used by
lawmakers to come up with new ways of effectively managing the United States patent system
and defeating the most notorious patent trolls.
42
